

Genocide and Exodus of Rohingyas: Repatriation Challenges for Bangladesh

Naznin Sultana Niti

Central Women's University, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Abstract: The Rohingya people have faced decades of systematic discrimination, statelessness and targeted violence in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Such oppression forced them into Bangladesh for long, with significant spikes following violent attacks in 1978, 1991-1992, and again in 2016. However, the largest and fastest refugee influx into Bangladesh was occurred in August 2017. Since then, an approximate of 745,000 Rohingyas—including more than 400,000 children—have fled into Cox's Bazar. Most of the villages in Myanmar, were burned and ruined, families were separated and killed, young women were physically assaulted. People who escaped were severely traumatized after witnessing unspeakable atrocities. These people found temporary shelter in refugee camps around Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, which is now home to the world's largest refugee camp. This article attempts to focus on the exodus of the Rohingyas, atrocities occurred against them, reactions of international community and Myanmar as well and further implications especially on Bangladesh.

Key Words: Rohingyas, Ethnic Conflict, Genocide, Exodus, Implications, Repatriation Issues

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I. INTRODUCTION

Myanmar has been deeply afflicted by ethno-religious tensions and armed conflicts since its independence in 1948. One among them is the simmering tension between the Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state in the western part of the country. There are scores of opinion on the Rohingya influx and repatriation issue with political leaders, scholars, and even ordinary people all weighing in with their own views. Given the current deadlock situation, it's quite hard to think of an optimistic view of the ongoing diplomatic efforts by the Bangladesh government and Myanmar's handling of the repatriation issue. Naypyidaw's initial deal for repatriation subsequently emaciated in early 2018 with a profound decline in interest, followed by a security blanket in the Rakhine state. There were two attempts – one in November, 2018 and the other on August 22, 2019, made within the last two years to begin the repatriation that led to no success as the Myanmar authorities failed to earn the trust of Rohingyas. They have violated bilateral instruments signed with Bangladesh. Apart from that, there is apparently very little confidence among the Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar in the possibility of a return anytime soon due to the ongoing monk-military-led crackdown and atrocities against the remaining 300,000 Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. It has been two years since some 800,000 Rohingyas escaped the violence and persecution in Rakhine to join an earlier group of more than 200,000—forced out of Myanmar in the 1990s—in Bangladesh. Of them, only 50,000 have official refugee status in the country; the rest are living in Cox's Bazar camps, as forcefully displaced Myanmar nationals.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Rakhine state extends some 560km along the northernmost part of Myanmar's coastline and borders with Bangladesh to the north-west. It is separated from Myanmar's central, low-lying landmass by the Yoma mountain range. The population size of Rakhine state is around 3.2 million with Buddhists comprising an estimated 2.1 million and Rohingya Muslims around a million.¹ An accurate statistics is notoriously difficult to establish as they were excluded from participating in the 2014 census. According to the estimate of uncounted persons in the 2014 census, the total number of Rohingya in Rakhine state is estimated over a million.² The Rakhine, also known as Arakanese, are an ethnic minority themselves in Myanmar, making up around 6 per cent of the national population. Most Rohingyas live in the townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung in northern Rakhine state, where they form a large majority population. Rakhine state is also home to a small number of Chin, Kaman, Mro, Khami, Dainet and Maramagyi ethnic minorities.

The Rohingyas are essentially people of Indo-Aryan descent who are denied recognition under the Myanmar nationality law. Mostly concentrated in the north western province of Rakhine, the Rohingya population has always faced systematic discrimination at the hands of the government and the Burmese people

at large, over the decades. However, to fully comprehend the real nature behind their statelessness, a look at the history pages is indispensable. Persecution of the Rohingya, Kachin, Shan, Karen and other minorities in Myanmar has been continuous since a military coup installed the Ne Win junta in 1962. The ethnic Burmese monopoly of political, economic, and military power has resulted in systematic oppression of non-Burman minority groups.

The British began their conquest in Burma as early as 1824, starting with a series of conflicts and wars against the established. As was the practice in India, colonial interests encouraged migrant labour in order to increase rice cultivation and profits. As part of requirements and policies, many Rohingya entered Burma during this phase of the seventeenth century. Between 1871 and 1911, the Muslim population tripled, as per available statistics from the census records. The British also promised the Rohingya separate land – a “Muslim national area” – in exchange for support. During the Second World War, the Rohingyas supported the British, while the nationalists sided with the Japanese intruders. Customary to tradition, the Rohingyas were rewarded well with prestigious governmental posts. However, the promise of a free state was denied to them. Right after independence in 1948, the Rohingya population started clamoring for the autonomous province they were promised, but officials rarely showed interest. Branding them foreigners, they were denied citizenship- and thus started the decades-long denial and oppression of the Rohingyas in present-day Myanmar. Other groups and nationalists had only hatred and contempt for the Rohingyas as the latter had enjoyed the patronage of the outgoing colonialists. Such built-up anger only contributed to growing fiery sentiments that were evidently anti-Rohingya. In 1950, some Rohingyas staged a protest against the government, demanding rights of citizenship and recognition, apart from their promised land- the Muslim national area. The army took over and in essence crushed all opposition from the Rohingyas- thus, silencing them for the upcoming decades. In 1977, when the army launched a drive to register citizens, the Rohingyas were deemed as illegal immigrants.³

ETHNIC CONFLICT

On-going ethnic conflict in Myanmar qualifies as the world’s longest running civil war. While the majority of conflicts have been between the central government and ethnic minorities on the question of autonomy, inter and intra tensions also exist within ethnic minorities. Mistrust between the government and ethnic groups has been in effect since colonial times. Ethnic groups feel that they must protect their culture, language, land, and resources from the Burmese government. The government fears the ethnic groups will destabilize or even cause a breakup of the Union of Myanmar. The government is also suspicious of the involvement of foreign powers in disputes with ethnic groups, especially those connected by non-Buddhist religious ties. In 1947, the Burmese government and the Shan, Chin, and Kachin ethnic groups signed the Panglong Agreement, which promised “full autonomy in internal administration for Frontier Areas”. The 1947 constitution also suggested the possibility of independence for ethnic minorities after ten years. Despite these promises, the Agreement was never truly implemented, and soon after it was signed, the military began ruling the ethnic areas by force. Ethnic groups viewed the Burmese military as an occupying force rather than a government, as it posted troops in these regions but did not provide schools, health care, or other public goods. In 1958, the ethnic groups realized they would not be granted the autonomy promised in the 1947 constitution, and took up arms in response. The adoption of Buddhism as the state religion in 1960 also caused renewed rebellions, as all non-Buddhists are part of minority ethnic groups. Ceasefires between the government and ethnic militias have been signed and broken repeatedly over the last few decades. Fear and mistrust between groups causes little incentive to uphold these On-going ethnic conflict in Myanmar qualifies as the world’s longest running civil war. While the majority of conflicts have been between the central government and ethnic minorities on the question of autonomy, inter and intra tensions also exist within ethnic minorities. Mistrust between the government and ethnic groups has been in effect since colonial times. Ethnic groups feel that they must protect their culture, language, land, and resources from the Burmese government. The government fears the ethnic groups will destabilize or even cause a breakup of the Union of Myanmar. The government is also suspicious of the involvement of foreign powers in disputes with ethnic groups, especially those connected by non-Buddhist religious ties. In 1947, the Burmese government and the Shan, Chin, and Kachin ethnic groups signed the Panglong Agreement, which promised “full autonomy in internal administration for Frontier Areas”. The 1947 constitution also suggested the possibility of independence for ethnic minorities after ten years. Despite these promises, the ceasefire deals. Today, many minority groups sight the Panglong Agreement in their demands, encouraging the government to finally uphold their portion of the deal.⁴ However, the government views these ethnic groups as a military problem rather than a political one. Some have claimed that the government uses tension with the Rohingya to justify its control over the country. The military argues that if it removes itself from politics, unrest and violence will emerge among the Rohingya and other ethnic groups. The government, then, actually has an incentive to encourage conflict with the Rohingya to keep up this charade. The Myanmar government officially identifies them as illegal Bengali migrants from neighboring Bangladesh, which also happens to be the general perception of the Myanmar people. The fact is that Rohingya is not

included among the 135 ethnic races of Myanmar recognized by the government. The origin of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar has been a sensitive and controversial subject. Some claim that the Rohingyas have lived in Myanmar for centuries and they are the descendants of Muslim Arabs, Moors, Persians, Turks, Mughals and Bengalis who came mostly as traders, warriors and saints through overland and sea routes.⁵ But whatever the root they may have, factually, not all the Muslims in Myanmar are Rohingya. So why the conflict between Rohingya and Myanmar government begun and how it turned into a Genocide

Atrocities against Rohingyas: Genocide or Else?

Drafted in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter, referred to as, Genocide Convention) was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. The Convention sets forth, in our view, a minimalist understanding of this crime, which reflects the era of its conception. Significantly, however, Article 2 of the Genocide Convention bestows protection against this crime upon four groups: ethnic, racial, religious, and national groups who confront the following:

- (1) Killing members of the group;
- (2) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (3) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (4) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (5) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

There is a strong consensus that the Genocide Convention is a political document that excludes most forms of group violence from falling under the legal category of genocide. Based upon this consideration, we find Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkowski's conceptualization of genocide most persuasive. Wallimann and Dobkowski (1987, x) argue that, "Genocide is the deliberate, organized destruction, in whole or in large part, of racial or ethnic groups by a government or its agents. It can involve not only mass murder but also forced deportation (ethnic cleansing), systematic rape, and economic and biological subjugation."⁶

The issue within Rakhine areas, was politicized since 1962 when General Ne Win made political campaign about Myanmarization¹ of Myanmar people that means "only Myanmar can be Myanmar citizen".⁷ The General Ne Win started a "Burmanization campaign" using the slogan "Burma is for Burmans", discriminating all the ethnic groups and the religious minorities not identified with the majority Buddhist religion. According to the Genocide Watch there are ten stage model of the processes that lead to genocide. They are not linear. Many of them occur simultaneously. But they provide a logical model for seeing the early warning signs and understanding how to prevent genocide by countering each stage.

1. Classification divides the society into "us" versus "them." The Rohingya and Kachin are classified as non-Burmese ethnic groups, with religions other than Buddhism. Most Rohingya are denied citizenship. The 1982 Citizenship Law holds that only members of the 135 groups named in the law that were deemed to be in Burma prior to 1823 can be citizens.
2. Symbolization provides ways to identify the groups. Rohingya and Kachin speak their own languages, have their own clothing, and have their own places of worship. The identity cards that Rohingya once held were taken away in 1989, and new ID's have only been issued to around 4000 Rohingyas on the condition that they say they are "Bengali," validating the government's false narrative that they are immigrants from Bangladesh.
3. Discrimination against Rohingya includes denial of government jobs, health care, education, and confiscation of land and property.
4. Dehumanization includes propaganda that Rohingya are jihadists, terrorists, murderers, and thieves. The leader of the 969 Movement, Monk Ashin Wirathu, has said that he wants to lead a campaign to purge Burma of all Muslims -"starve them to death, make them homeless." He was jailed for his involvement in burning alive an entire Muslim family -a well-to-do grocer and a Haj returnee- in his birthplace.
5. Organization includes the 969 movement, extremist orders of monks, and the Tatmadaw government army and police. They carry out the murders and disappearances, torture, rapes, and arson of Rohingya villages.
6. Polarization has resulted in creation of concentration camps for Rohingyas and separation of them from the Rakhine Buddhist population.
7. Preparation has included planning for aggression and arson against Rohingya villages, and recently the buildup and invasion by large numbers of Tatmadaw troops in Rakhine state, with trucks and heavy weapons.
8. Persecution [itself a crime against humanity] has included forcing the Rohingya into concentration camps, denying them medical care, food, and water, torture, and mass rape. Many Rohingya have fled in rickety boats and large numbers have drowned while fleeing.

9. Genocidal massacres have resulted in thousands of deaths. Starvation and death from disease in concentration camps, especially of children and the elderly, have cost thousands of lives. Births are restricted through limits on family size to two children. Others cannot get birth certificates, a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Myanmar is a state party.
10. Denial permeates government statements, including the statements of Aung San Suu Kyi. The UN Commission of Inquiry, UN Special Rapporteur and other neutral observers have been barred from the country. In 1978, Burma's Tatmadaw army launched systematic persecution against the Rohingya that resulted in destruction of their mosques, mass murder and rape. The persecution accelerated in 1991 and 1992 when a renewed wave of oppression and pogroms drove an estimated 250,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh and makeshift camps around Burma's coastal borders.

International and Regional Response

International and regional responses to the crisis have been disappointing. Several governments remained silent while some supported Myanmar's fragile democratic reform and a few had strongly criticized the Government's failure to protect its population. China, which is now the largest foreign investor for Bangladesh, seems to appreciate the problems that Rohingya refugees pose for the country and is expected to play a mediator's role between Bangladesh and Myanmar to find a quick and elective solution. China is understood to have taken a new position on the Rohingya refugees to help settle the impasse between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Instead of internationalizing the issue, China said it would try to persuade Myanmar to resolve the crisis through bilateral dialogue.

The return of the forcibly displaced people to their homeland would be a solution, China felt. China's position was clarified by President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang during Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's state visit to Beijing in the first week of July.⁸

Neither Myanmar's de facto leader, Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, nor the country's human rights groups and the pro-democracy activists outright condemn the violence. Suu Kyi, has been criticized by the international community for not sufficiently condemning the renewed violence. The international community's expectation from Aung San Suu Kyi was high since she has been admired by many as an icon of democracy movement and human rights. However, she is also chairperson of the National League for Democracy, the largest opposition political party, and rule of law committee in the parliament that was created to oversee the importance of rule of law in the country, said both sides of the conflicting parties are culpable and that rule of law must prevail. During her tour to the United States of America in September 2012, Suu Kyi was asked at Harvard University why she did not condemn the violence targeted toward the Rohingya Muslims. Her response was that 'You must not forget that there have been human rights violations on both sides of the communal divide. It's not a matter of condemning one community or the other. I condemn all human rights violations'⁹ Again in an exclusive interview with the BBC in April 2017, she acknowledged problems in Rakhine state but she said ethnic cleansing was "too strong" a term to use. She asserted:

"I don't think there is ethnic cleansing going on. I think ethnic cleansing is too strong an expression to use for what is happening,...there is a lot of hostility there - it is Muslims killing Muslims as well, if they think they are co-operating with the authorities,"¹⁰

While the scope of her actions is limited, she possesses one power in abundance: the power to speak out. Rather than deploying it, her response amounts to a mixture of silence and the denial of well-documented evidences, and the obstruction of humanitarian aid.¹¹

The Burmese government denies the existence of the Rohingya by contending that they are not an ethnic group of the country. It follows that the government is not responsible for their wellbeing, as the Rohingya do not constitute the Burmese population. Government reports have also denied that the slaughter of Rohingya Muslims occurred, and in instances where the international media has reported on the Rakhine atrocities, President Sein has either denied the violations entirely or transferred the blame to a small number of Buddhist nationals. The government's evasion of blame for the atrocities in Rakhine poses a challenge for accountability, as the refusal of the state to acknowledge its responsibility prevents it from adopting measures to improve the situation. Despite the ongoing atrocities in Rakhine, Burma continues to profit from its improved relationship with the international community, reducing the incentive for the government to adequately address the situation. President Sein and the Burmese government continue to avoid responsibility for the conditions in Rakhine by employing a variety of evasive techniques. One such technique involves "manipulating the flow of information about action, events and policies".¹²

The people of Myanmar in general and the Rakhines in particular, who are overwhelmingly Buddhists, apparently do not use the term Rohingya. They rather use Bengali, and sometimes a derogatory term '*kalar*' (a slur reserved for foreigners of South Asian origin). During the violence, pamphlets were disseminated in Rakhine state which stirred up fear and anger among the local Buddhists. The pamphlets suggested that the global Islamic plan has made inroads into non-Muslim countries in different forms, such as the practice of

polygamy, building and expansion of mosques, and seeking an ethnic minority status for the Rohingya Muslims. Though it was not substantiated, some alleged that the pamphlets could have been the strategy of the government. Majority of the Myanmar people including monks strongly support the president's proposal to resettle the Rohingyas to a third country. They also complain that the international community, particularly the UN, unnecessarily intervened in the sectarian violence in favor of the Rohingyas.¹³ Humanitarian organizations expected stronger sanctions on Myanmar from powerful countries. This never happened. Instead, many countries involved in trade and business with Myanmar, which emboldened Myanmar to perpetrate atrocities on Rohingya. While there are criticisms that the international organizations have failed miserably to show that they care about humanity and human rights.¹⁴

Repatriation of Rohingyas: A Humanitarian Concern for Bangladesh

The Rohingya situation is strikingly reminiscent of Jews in Nazi Germany or apartheid-era South Africa. They are in a very difficult situation. They are trapped with no rights and nowhere to go. The Rohingya's lack of citizenship has led to a lack of representation, rights, and freedoms. Bangladesh is currently hosting an estimated 1.1 million Rohingyas, most of whom fled their homes in Rakhine State after the military launched a brutal offensive against the ethnic minority in August and September 2017. More than 740,000 people from Myanmar have fled and his followed an earlier wave of violence in October which forced over 80,000 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh. Flooding into camps near the town of Cox's Bazar, they joined more than 200,000 people who fled to Bangladesh years earlier. More than 55% of Rohingya refugees are children.¹⁵ The UN does serve about 25,000 Rohingya who live in official UN camps. But the majority of Rohingya live in unofficial camps or ghettos where they receive no help. Bangladesh's gesture of providing shelter to a million refugees is laudable at a time when most countries are building walls, pushing asylum seekers back at the borders, and deporting them. An estimated 900,000 Rohingyas now live in the Kutupalong mega camp, the largest in the world, which is built on a deforested hilly landscape in the Cox's Bazar area. A scattered community of some 200,000 remained behind in Rakhine state, in villages that were spared the violence.¹⁶ These Rohingyas are currently facing the following problems:

- Forced to live in camps and ghettos
- Prevented from accessing basic human services such as education and healthcare
- Banned from government jobs, running for office, and voting
- Coerced into working hard labor by the government
- Unable to marry without government permissions which is rarely granted
- Limited in the number of children they can have

Burmese government's restrictions on the aid for the Rohingyas is worsening these difficult conditions. So not only the repatriation of the Rohingyas living in Bangladesh but also building a complete environment to accept them as nationals of Myanmar is equally important. Bangladesh appreciates its humble position in global politics and its government has been trying to chalk out some realistic policies in regard to their repatriation as well as their well-being for their long compulsive stay here in Bangladesh. It gave Rohingyas shelter on humanitarian grounds but they are not Bangladesh's headache rather it is the headache of the whole world. Myanmar must be accommodative and it must convince their nationals to go back to their place of origin in Rakhine State. According to Dr. Shamsul Bari, Like any other large-scale refugee situation, the best solution for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is to go back home voluntarily, in safety and dignity, in pursuit of normal lives once again. Voluntary repatriation is normally the only viable solution for most refugee situations in the world. Around 70 percent of world's refugees since World War II have found durable solutions by returning home. The refugees themselves have expressed their wish to go back home in Myanmar, if they can do so in safety and dignity and some basic conditions are met. But they see no hope on the horizon in this regard. They were told last year that Myanmar had agreed to take back those who wished to return voluntarily under a bilateral agreement with the Government of Bangladesh. But when the scheduled date for commencement of repatriation arrived on November 15, 2018, there were no volunteers, mainly because they received no guarantees from the Myanmar authorities on their basic demands. Since then, there has been very little progress in the situation, only empty assurances from time to time. Most observers agree that safe and stable return under existing circumstances is not conceivable.¹⁷

With the refugees thus not willing to go back, there was growing speculation, both inside and outside the camps, about the other two possible solutions, namely third country resettlement and local integration. They appear to have subsided for the time being but they are likely to resurface. It is important that they are nipped in the bud so that false expectations are not created.

As for third country resettlement, it is clear that there is no hope, under the present state of international affairs, that so many people would be offered resettlement opportunities in third countries. Secondly, even if it were possible, it would be a bad precedent for the international community. There are many countries in the

world where large groups, like the Rohingyas, exist, who are disliked by the majority population and could be targeted for similar expulsion, expecting that they too would be resettled elsewhere. This would do great damage to the hallowed principles of asylum and refugee protection developed over centuries. Thirdly, even a discussion about third country resettlement of the Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh might unsettle the remaining half a million or so Rohingyas still living in Myanmar and provoke them to join the queue in Bangladesh. The combined pull and push factors will be too much for Bangladesh and the international community to handle. Instead of solving the problem, new problems may arise. For traumatized victims of serious crimes, others in need of medical attention unavailable in the camps, and those who qualify for family re-unification abroad, could be considered for resettlement. But when a crisis of such a large magnitude unfolds, the primary focus of all concerned is, of course, on attending to the immediate assistance needs of the refugees.¹⁸

It will be impossible for Bangladesh, itself an overpopulated country, to absorb such a huge population without serious social, economic and political consequences. No government will be able to deal with the situation without peril to its own survival. Of course, a few refugees will always merge in locally, as has happened in the past. But it cannot be the main solution for the majority. That brings us back to voluntary repatriation as the only viable solution for the vast majority of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh. It is important that all the parties involved with the problem understand and accept the reality. That includes Bangladesh, Myanmar, the other two immediate neighbours, India and China, plus countries with interest in the region like Japan and Russia, ASEAN countries, the UN and the international community as a whole. All must realize the inherent dangers in letting such a large group of people simmer in hopelessness and despair in the camps.

Besides, there was also an outcry for accountability of the perpetrators of the terrible crimes which caused the refugee outflow. Charges of genocide and crimes against humanity inevitably emerged from refugee narratives and the graphic images which filled the media. In such a situation, Bangladesh had three likely options before it: 1) to let the UN take the leadership role both for assistance and durable solutions for the refugees; 2) to join others in denouncing Myanmar, pursue the accountability path, even if it led to enmity and hostility with it; and 3) to undertake a bilateral approach of diplomacy, persuasion and cooperation with Myanmar to promote quick repatriation of the refugees.

As the host country, beset with such a large refugee population, Bangladesh will have to take the lead in any comprehensive strategy. It will have to take the initiative to engage, with the involvement with the UN if considered useful, in renewed and more focused negotiations with Myanmar to resolve the crisis. The pros and cons of positive engagement between the two countries will have to be expounded painstakingly. Bangladesh will also have to undertake other bilateral and multilateral initiatives to keep the issue alive in the mind of the international community and to garner their support in ensuring Myanmar's commitment to the process. Appointing a special representative of the prime minister for the Rohingya issue, who would promote the message all over the world in a relentless manner, may help. It would be immensely useful if the prime minister continues to undertake visits to important capitals to share Bangladesh's concern with world leaders and brief them about the dangers of stagnation and non-return, as she did recently with China.¹⁹

Bangladesh is now waiting to see how Myanmar, who has always been uninterested in repatriation, reacts to the ICJ orders since the ICJ (International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal United Nations judicial organ, on 23 January 2020, directed Myanmar to stop the genocide against the Rohingya, dismissing the Gambia lawsuit filed on the Rohingya issue and reconsidering possible consequences on the repatriation process.²⁰

III. CONCLUSION

The complexity of the Rohingya problem fundamentally lies in the fact that they are not considered citizens of Myanmar. This makes the case unique from the rest of the conflicts in the country. While other ethnic minorities demand autonomy under a federal set up, the Rohingya Muslims struggle to be recognized as one of the ethnic groups of the country. Numerous evidence proves that the Rohingya Muslims have not only been marginalized economically and socially but excluded politically both in the formation of Rakhine state government and the central government. A reconciliation program may have a chance to get to the top if Rohingyas and Rakhines, will accept their differences by respecting each other's identity and culture. Although Rohingya issue is not an issue to be ignored, looking at its dimension of fallout and scale of impacts on the region and beyond, this has, however, not received required attention of the world community in the past. The magnitude of persecution and atrocities being faced by the Rohingyas this time is way above anybody's imagination and that the world cannot afford to overlook it any more. The international community and the United Nations must play a critical role in addressing this ongoing crisis. They should mobilize political pressure on the Government of Myanmar to find a durable solution for this crisis. The durable solution must include the right to return to their homeland in a safe, secured and dignified way. All fundamental human rights of the Rohingya should be respected during the process of resolving the current crisis. As Bangladesh has

certainly done its part when it comes to the Rohingya crisis, responding with empathy to a group of people who fell victim to hatred. Now it is up to the world to help keep it that way by making sure that Bangladesh does not shoulder this burden alone.

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- ²⁰ "Foreign Minister: ICJ orders humanity to win", 23 January 2020, Available at: <https://bangla.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2020/01/23/19403/%E0%A6%AA%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B7%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%9F%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A4%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%80:%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%87%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%9C%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%A6%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B6%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%9C%E0%A7%9F>